arXiv:2611.10704v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Evaluations of AI systems usually report properties of a model, while decisions to deploy concern a configured system: a model together with prompts, tools, permissions, data, safeguards and an operating context. We ask how evidence about technical failures, deployment-control effectiveness and real-world consequences can be connected to defensible authorization decisions throughout the lifecycle of a deployed system. We present R-BED (Risk-Based Evaluability Design), a specification-level methodology with a fixed 6+4+3 architecture of thirteen diagnostic dimensions (technical failure, deployment controls, consequence and impact); a failure-mediated expected-loss identity that is kept separate from intended-behavior and misuse pathways; bounded evidence statuses with independence levels; a control assurance ladder; five authorization dispositions governed by eight rules; and a Continuous System Evaluation (CSE) layer in which evidence carries a configuration pin, an expiry and declared dependencies, so that a change invalidates evidence in proportion rather than wholesale. We work through a synthetic refund-agent walkthrough, with a deterministic script that reproduces every number, to show how a task-success view can miss a consequential control weakness that the procedure identifies as missing evidence. The contribution is a reproducible methodological specification. Most components are standard practice integrated into one evidence-to-decision record; the Evidence Validity Register, the authority envelope and the tier rules are proposals. None has been empirically validated, and we state seven hypotheses for independent testing.
Abstract: Evaluations of AI systems usually report properties of a model, while decisions to deploy concern a configured system: a model together with prompts, tools, permissions, data, safeguards and an operating context. We ask how evidence about technical failures, deployment-control effectiveness and real-world consequences can be connected to defensible authorization decisions throughout the lifecycle of a deployed system. We present R-BED (Risk-Based Evaluability Design), a specification-level methodology with a fixed 6+4+3 architecture of thirteen diagnostic dimensions (technical failure, deployment controls, consequence and impact); a failure-mediated expected-loss identity that is kept separate from intended-behavior and misuse pathways; bounded evidence statuses with independence levels; a control assurance ladder; five authorization dispositions governed by eight rules; and a Continuous System Evaluation (CSE) layer in which evidence carries a configuration pin, an expiry and declared dependencies, so that a change invalidates evidence in proportion rather than wholesale. We work through a synthetic refund-agent walkthrough, with a deterministic script that reproduces every number, to show how a task-success view can miss a consequential control weakness that the procedure identifies as missing evidence. The contribution is a reproducible methodological specification. Most components are standard practice integrated into one evidence-to-decision record; the Evidence Validity Register, the authority envelope and the tier rules are proposals. None has been empirically validated, and we state seven hypotheses for independent testing.
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R-BED: A Consequence-Aware Framework for System-Level AI Evaluation and Continuous Assurance