Honest Brokers in AI Regulation: How Public Comments Introduce Evidence to Regulators

arXiv:2611.21948v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The regulation of Artificial Intelligence is susceptible to various forms of capture by industry actors that hold undue influence over the policymaking process, due in part to their information advantage in developing these technologies. In the following paper, we investigate the roles of public commenters in providing evidence to potential regulation in the USA. We build a corpus of 40 potential regulations, and 2,664 public comments submitted by a variety of stakeholders. We computationally process these texts to extract evidence meant to inform regulators, in the form of formal citations and informal references. We find significant differences in the type and amount of evidence supplied: Holding comment length constant, business commenters introduce altogether less evidence, and government, university, and civil society commenters provide significantly more research and legal sources. The publication status of cited research is nearly evenly split, with preprints and peer-reviewed articles being introduced by commenters of all types. We further explore patterns of self-citation and find that while it is prevalent amongst all groups, a small cluster of organizations account for over half of all self-citations in our corpus. Our findings complicate a narrative that public comments alone are means to information capture. We interpret these results in terms of the role that commenters attempt to play in the policymaking process-being either an Issue Advocate or an Honest Broker. These findings on the supply of evidence in public comments shed light on an often overlooked form of policymaking that has implications for how and through what sources information is made accessible to regulators of AI.
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Honest Brokers in AI Regulation: How Public Comments Introduce Evidence to Regulators