arXiv:2611.25339v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As LLM agents increasingly generate RTL alongside the tests and reviews that validate it, self-generated evidence is a weak foundation for trustworthy hardware. We present our seven-stage verification-gated workflow, evolved during a post-quantum design port, in which a gate counts only if shown able to fail on negative controls and fault mutants, and reviewer agents audit work before commit. We then audit this evidence with tool-selected netlist mutants, flaw replays, and formal checks. The flow ported an ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA-65 accelerator to a 300 MHz Zynq UltraScale+ key-custody card: all six operations are byte-exact on the board, and it passes all 85 interface-applicable NIST ACVP cases (of 285) and 484 ML-DSA known answers. However, passing module tests overstate the verification strength. Across three RTL modules, existing simulation gates kill only 76% of 399 tool-selected netlist mutants; specification-derived tests guided by the survivors raise the fresh-draw decapsulation kill rate from 48% to 74%. In pre-registered single-model replays on flaws invisible to known-answer tests, undirected whole-design review catches two verifier flaws in only 3/6 and 1/6 sessions, whereas module-scoped review catches every known flaw in all 54 sessions. Even scoped review detects planted key-custody flaws in only 3/20 sessions, whereas formal checks (one added for the replay) flag every one. In this study, trustworthy agentic hardware needed author-independent mutants for test gates, module-level scoping for LLM review, and formal checks for custody invariants.
Abstract: As LLM agents increasingly generate RTL alongside the tests and reviews that validate it, self-generated evidence is a weak foundation for trustworthy hardware. We present our seven-stage verification-gated workflow, evolved during a post-quantum design port, in which a gate counts only if shown able to fail on negative controls and fault mutants, and reviewer agents audit work before commit. We then audit this evidence with tool-selected netlist mutants, flaw replays, and formal checks. The flow ported an ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA-65 accelerator to a 300 MHz Zynq UltraScale+ key-custody card: all six operations are byte-exact on the board, and it passes all 85 interface-applicable NIST ACVP cases (of 285) and 484 ML-DSA known answers. However, passing module tests overstate the verification strength. Across three RTL modules, existing simulation gates kill only 76% of 399 tool-selected netlist mutants; specification-derived tests guided by the survivors raise the fresh-draw decapsulation kill rate from 48% to 74%. In pre-registered single-model replays on flaws invisible to known-answer tests, undirected whole-design review catches two verifier flaws in only 3/6 and 1/6 sessions, whereas module-scoped review catches every known flaw in all 54 sessions. Even scoped review detects planted key-custody flaws in only 3/20 sessions, whereas formal checks (one added for the replay) flag every one. In this study, trustworthy agentic hardware needed author-independent mutants for test gates, module-level scoping for LLM review, and formal checks for custody invariants.
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