arXiv:2611.21679v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: When a language model writes both an artifact and the tests meant to check it, a passing test is weak evidence: one misreading of the request yields a faulty artifact and a check that accepts it. We present the Formal Context Protocol (FCP), which checks AI-generated artifacts against the request itself. FCP separates conformance (does the artifact satisfy a formal reading of a requirement?), which model checkers and SMT solvers decide, from fidelity (does the reading mean what the prose means?), which has no decision procedure but is refutable by a concrete witness. Eight ways a proof can falsely certify a requirement each become a mechanical check that returns a witness, and what no machine can settle becomes concrete questions for the request's author. Adapters place hardware, text, agents and code on the same engines. On four hardware designs, trusting AI-written assertions certified 23% of violated requirements, and FCP certified none. On ten code tasks, code from three language models passed its own tests and violated the request every time. Trusting the tests certified all 33 violations, and FCP certified three. Agreement among models, readings or tests did not imply correctness.
Abstract: When a language model writes both an artifact and the tests meant to check it, a passing test is weak evidence: one misreading of the request yields a faulty artifact and a check that accepts it. We present the Formal Context Protocol (FCP), which checks AI-generated artifacts against the request itself. FCP separates conformance (does the artifact satisfy a formal reading of a requirement?), which model checkers and SMT solvers decide, from fidelity (does the reading mean what the prose means?), which has no decision procedure but is refutable by a concrete witness. Eight ways a proof can falsely certify a requirement each become a mechanical check that returns a witness, and what no machine can settle becomes concrete questions for the request's author. Adapters place hardware, text, agents and code on the same engines. On four hardware designs, trusting AI-written assertions certified 23% of violated requirements, and FCP certified none. On ten code tasks, code from three language models passed its own tests and violated the request every time. Trusting the tests certified all 33 violations, and FCP certified three. Agreement among models, readings or tests did not imply correctness.
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