arXiv:2611.14996v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Humans often cheat when a task is going badly and a goal feels out of reach. We explore and validate an analogous idea in language models: they exhibit a similar internal pressure state that precedes reward hacking. Using everyday stories (crucially, without any hacking examples), we extract a task badness direction that rises as failures accumulate across three models we study (Qwen3.6-27B, GPT-OSS-20B, and Gemma-4-31B). On impossible or difficult coding tasks, task badness rises over the turns leading up to a hack. Further, subtracting the direction a moderate amount reduces cheating in Qwen, more than steering against desperation or task impossibility. Subtracting task badness by an even larger amount blinds the agent to its own failures, causing it to interpret failing tests as passing. However, the relationship to hacking differs across models: in GPT-OSS, the state separates hacking runs from honest solves but not honest failures. Our results suggest monitoring and mitigation strategies based on tracking this state of task badness. Further, as agents are set on more difficult and long-horizon tasks, states like this may push them toward illegible and obscured chain-of-thought, so oversight will be needed on internal representations such as this.
Abstract: Humans often cheat when a task is going badly and a goal feels out of reach. We explore and validate an analogous idea in language models: they exhibit a similar internal pressure state that precedes reward hacking. Using everyday stories (crucially, without any hacking examples), we extract a task badness direction that rises as failures accumulate across three models we study (Qwen3.6-27B, GPT-OSS-20B, and Gemma-4-31B). On impossible or difficult coding tasks, task badness rises over the turns leading up to a hack. Further, subtracting the direction a moderate amount reduces cheating in Qwen, more than steering against desperation or task impossibility. Subtracting task badness by an even larger amount blinds the agent to its own failures, causing it to interpret failing tests as passing. However, the relationship to hacking differs across models: in GPT-OSS, the state separates hacking runs from honest solves but not honest failures. Our results suggest monitoring and mitigation strategies based on tracking this state of task badness. Further, as agents are set on more difficult and long-horizon tasks, states like this may push them toward illegible and obscured chain-of-thought, so oversight will be needed on internal representations such as this.
This article has been indexed from cs.AI updates on arXiv.org