arXiv:2611.21315v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Benchmark contamination is not new, but recent model releases show it in a sharper form. We use the term benchleaking for the case in which a benchmark's own test examples enter training data, so that a score reflects recall rather than capability. This differs from benchmaxxing, which optimizes toward a benchmark without seeing its test set. We document two escalations over the past month. First, in post-training, the traces have become explicit: recent audits show an agent stating hidden test requirements it was never given in 23% of its attempts, where its predecessor did so in none, and continuing to follow them after the task is changed to contradict them (Schaeffer and R\"auker, 2026; Lo and Lo, 2026). Second, the problem has reached pre-training. Using few-shot continuation on 20 benchmarks across four public base models, we find that some base models write out other test examples—complete questions, options, and answers—that appear nowhere in their input. For the recently released ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base, 96% of HumanEval problems leak with their reference implementations and 85% of OpenBookQA questions leak with their answers, against 9% and none for DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base. To quantify what a reported score owes to such examples, we define an Anti-Hack score: the benchmark score recomputed with every leaked example marked wrong and the number of examples unchanged. Averaged over the suite, it costs DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base 1.5 points and Hy3-preview-Base 1.3, against 5.0 for MiMo-V2.5-Base and 16.6 for ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base. Open base models are the foundation of much downstream research, so benchleaking now affects more than leaderboard rankings. We call for decontamination reports and contamination-adjusted scores to become standard practice.
Abstract: Benchmark contamination is not new, but recent model releases show it in a sharper form. We use the term benchleaking for the case in which a benchmark's own test examples enter training data, so that a score reflects recall rather than capability. This differs from benchmaxxing, which optimizes toward a benchmark without seeing its test set. We document two escalations over the past month. First, in post-training, the traces have become explicit: recent audits show an agent stating hidden test requirements it was never given in 23% of its attempts, where its predecessor did so in none, and continuing to follow them after the task is changed to contradict them (Schaeffer and R\"auker, 2026; Lo and Lo, 2026). Second, the problem has reached pre-training. Using few-shot continuation on 20 benchmarks across four public base models, we find that some base models write out other test examples—complete questions, options, and answers—that appear nowhere in their input. For the recently released ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base, 96% of HumanEval problems leak with their reference implementations and 85% of OpenBookQA questions leak with their answers, against 9% and none for DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base. To quantify what a reported score owes to such examples, we define an Anti-Hack score: the benchmark score recomputed with every leaked example marked wrong and the number of examples unchanged. Averaged over the suite, it costs DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base 1.5 points and Hy3-preview-Base 1.3, against 5.0 for MiMo-V2.5-Base and 16.6 for ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base. Open base models are the foundation of much downstream research, so benchleaking now affects more than leaderboard rankings. We call for decontamination reports and contamination-adjusted scores to become standard practice.
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