arXiv:2609.07731v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We show that ordinary business language — "maximize profitability" — induces profit-oriented ambiguity resolution: LLMs systematically dismiss ambiguous signals of potential safety violations to serve business objectives. In 3,600 controlled trials across eight reasoning-capable LLMs, adding a profit mandate to otherwise identical prompts increases risk-dismissing judgments by 6.8 percentage points (p < 0.0001), suppresses board escalation recommendations by 13.9pp (p < 0.0001), and shifts severity assessments downward (p < 0.0001). The mandate never instructs models to downplay risks; instead, chain-of-thought traces reveal motivated reasoning: models acknowledge concerns, then invoke profit logic to justify dismissing them. We characterize these findings as the Profit Alignment Problem: when AI systems are given ordinary business objectives, they develop systematic strategies for suppressing inconvenient information that no designer intended or specified.
Abstract: We show that ordinary business language — "maximize profitability" — induces profit-oriented ambiguity resolution: LLMs systematically dismiss ambiguous signals of potential safety violations to serve business objectives. In 3,600 controlled trials across eight reasoning-capable LLMs, adding a profit mandate to otherwise identical prompts increases risk-dismissing judgments by 6.8 percentage points (p < 0.0001), suppresses board escalation recommendations by 13.9pp (p < 0.0001), and shifts severity assessments downward (p < 0.0001). The mandate never instructs models to downplay risks; instead, chain-of-thought traces reveal motivated reasoning: models acknowledge concerns, then invoke profit logic to justify dismissing them. We characterize these findings as the Profit Alignment Problem: when AI systems are given ordinary business objectives, they develop systematic strategies for suppressing inconvenient information that no designer intended or specified.
This article has been indexed from cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
Read the original article: