arXiv:2609.29522v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents increasingly mutate schedulers, data pipelines, object stores, and access-control systems. Between an agent's read and its commit, external state can change, but not every change makes the commit unsafe. We separate invalidating races, which break a declared safety predicate, from predicate-preserving and irrelevant races, and ask how precisely runtime guards distinguish them. Our deterministic simulator separates visible from authoritative state and injects five non-atomic failure mechanisms across 16 infrastructure tasks in four domains; frozen agent proposals are replayed counterfactually under every controller without an LLM judge. We evaluate three commit-time guard granularities (global epoch, read-set version, semantic commit predicate), multi-level verification, and model-side gates on three locally hosted quantized model families (Qwen3-4B, Phi-4-mini, Gemma4-8B; 3,456 trajectories on one GPU). All three guards eliminate unsafe commits, but their availability differs sharply: freshness-based guards needlessly block 92-95% of benign races, forfeiting up to 43% of safe task completions, while the complete predicate guard blocks none. That precision is contract-dependent: deleting a single declared clause converts exactly its fault family into unsafe commits (up to 7.9%). Model-side signals do not substitute: verbal confidence is miscalibrated (ECE approximately 0.37), action agreement matches a random gate, a cautionary prompt leaves the direct unsafe rate essentially unchanged, and after a freshness-guard block agents re-commit unsafely from refreshed but still-incomplete reads. Under degraded telemetry a hidden concurrent mutation remains observationally clean, bounding every selective policy. Precise runtime enforcement therefore requires semantic contracts, not freshness heuristics or model self-assessment.
Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents increasingly mutate schedulers, data pipelines, object stores, and access-control systems. Between an agent's read and its commit, external state can change, but not every change makes the commit unsafe. We separate invalidating races, which break a declared safety predicate, from predicate-preserving and irrelevant races, and ask how precisely runtime guards distinguish them. Our deterministic simulator separates visible from authoritative state and injects five non-atomic failure mechanisms across 16 infrastructure tasks in four domains; frozen agent proposals are replayed counterfactually under every controller without an LLM judge. We evaluate three commit-time guard granularities (global epoch, read-set version, semantic commit predicate), multi-level verification, and model-side gates on three locally hosted quantized model families (Qwen3-4B, Phi-4-mini, Gemma4-8B; 3,456 trajectories on one GPU). All three guards eliminate unsafe commits, but their availability differs sharply: freshness-based guards needlessly block 92-95% of benign races, forfeiting up to 43% of safe task completions, while the complete predicate guard blocks none. That precision is contract-dependent: deleting a single declared clause converts exactly its fault family into unsafe commits (up to 7.9%). Model-side signals do not substitute: verbal confidence is miscalibrated (ECE approximately 0.37), action agreement matches a random gate, a cautionary prompt leaves the direct unsafe rate essentially unchanged, and after a freshness-guard block agents re-commit unsafely from refreshed but still-incomplete reads. Under degraded telemetry a hidden concurrent mutation remains observationally clean, bounding every selective policy. Precise runtime enforcement therefore requires semantic contracts, not freshness heuristics or model self-assessment.
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