arXiv:2609.14121v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The Semantic Web set out to give information a machine-interpretable form so that software could integrate and reason over it. Its standards became scientific knowledge infrastructure, but the machine competence it promised did not follow, and the systems now answering questions over scientific knowledge are language models holding no inspectable account of what they know. This paper argues the original goal was right and the technical programme incomplete, states what is missing, and names the extended programme Semantic Knowledge Technologies: the same technical core carried out of its web-publishing origin and applied to knowledge wherever held. The diagnosis is that the standards formalised truth while omitting three things: the conditions under which a claim holds, the operations its terms permit, and any account of what a base covers. Without conditions, contradiction and applicability cannot be judged; without operational grounding, holding a statement confers no ability; without declared coverage, a system cannot recognise the boundary of its own content, which under the open-world assumption cannot be inferred. The paper fixes the word understanding to five measurable tests (check, connect, derive, act, delimit) and sets out a seven-layer architecture in which the first three layers are enabling and the rest the cognitive capabilities they make possible. It then defines three terms the programme implies: Large Knowledge Model, a model whose unit of output is a reference to an addressable claim, not a token; SLKM, the knowledge base an agent builds for itself from declared sources; and Semantic Artificial General Intelligence, stated as a falsifiable position about necessary conditions, not a system. A graded ladder replaces the untestable word general. It is offered as a research agenda, with its weakest points and refutation condition named.
Abstract: The Semantic Web set out to give information a machine-interpretable form so that software could integrate and reason over it. Its standards became scientific knowledge infrastructure, but the machine competence it promised did not follow, and the systems now answering questions over scientific knowledge are language models holding no inspectable account of what they know. This paper argues the original goal was right and the technical programme incomplete, states what is missing, and names the extended programme Semantic Knowledge Technologies: the same technical core carried out of its web-publishing origin and applied to knowledge wherever held. The diagnosis is that the standards formalised truth while omitting three things: the conditions under which a claim holds, the operations its terms permit, and any account of what a base covers. Without conditions, contradiction and applicability cannot be judged; without operational grounding, holding a statement confers no ability; without declared coverage, a system cannot recognise the boundary of its own content, which under the open-world assumption cannot be inferred. The paper fixes the word understanding to five measurable tests (check, connect, derive, act, delimit) and sets out a seven-layer architecture in which the first three layers are enabling and the rest the cognitive capabilities they make possible. It then defines three terms the programme implies: Large Knowledge Model, a model whose unit of output is a reference to an addressable claim, not a token; SLKM, the knowledge base an agent builds for itself from declared sources; and Semantic Artificial General Intelligence, stated as a falsifiable position about necessary conditions, not a system. A graded ladder replaces the untestable word general. It is offered as a research agenda, with its weakest points and refutation condition named.
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