arXiv:2611.16455v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Artificial superintelligences (ASI) is artificial intelligences with greater capability. However, as human principal has to use it, we have to ensure that the agent will perform in the interest of the human. We investigate the framework of ASI-assisted question answering where ASI agents know the correct answer but the human does not. We provide some example of mechanism for rational alignment, where the agent utility is unchanged, but the interaction between the agent and the human principal is controlled to be in a certain fashion. We show specifically that a debate framework where the agents can further reason and behave in a subgame perfect equilibrium manner will lead to a more predictable result, and in some case will be favorable.
Abstract: Artificial superintelligences (ASI) is artificial intelligences with greater capability. However, as human principal has to use it, we have to ensure that the agent will perform in the interest of the human. We investigate the framework of ASI-assisted question answering where ASI agents know the correct answer but the human does not. We provide some example of mechanism for rational alignment, where the agent utility is unchanged, but the interaction between the agent and the human principal is controlled to be in a certain fashion. We show specifically that a debate framework where the agents can further reason and behave in a subgame perfect equilibrium manner will lead to a more predictable result, and in some case will be favorable.
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