arXiv:2610.07657v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) engage tools, share memory, and delegate tasks, often encountering adversarial content. Current defenses for MAS are typically evaluated in isolation, focusing on one attack type at a time, which can lead to costly and hard-to-audit outcomes. This study organizes defenses into five principles, implementing them as DEFER1 (DEterministic-First Enforcement with Residual judgment), which includes a cascade of 28 checks that blocks what it can and refers the rest to a panel of four judges. In independent testing across four domains, attack success rates drop from about 30.0% to approximately 3.0%, with 78% of blocked attacks handled by deterministic checks. Only a quarter of proposals reach the judges in the security-operations domain, illustrating that the rules provide security for attacks violating clear policies, while judges manage those that only misrepresent intent. Both systems have weaknesses, such as a risk-score approval gate that inaccurately approves most attack proposals but few legitimate ones, highlighting the challenges in assessing threats accurately.
Abstract: LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) engage tools, share memory, and delegate tasks, often encountering adversarial content. Current defenses for MAS are typically evaluated in isolation, focusing on one attack type at a time, which can lead to costly and hard-to-audit outcomes. This study organizes defenses into five principles, implementing them as DEFER1 (DEterministic-First Enforcement with Residual judgment), which includes a cascade of 28 checks that blocks what it can and refers the rest to a panel of four judges. In independent testing across four domains, attack success rates drop from about 30.0% to approximately 3.0%, with 78% of blocked attacks handled by deterministic checks. Only a quarter of proposals reach the judges in the security-operations domain, illustrating that the rules provide security for attacks violating clear policies, while judges manage those that only misrepresent intent. Both systems have weaknesses, such as a risk-score approval gate that inaccurately approves most attack proposals but few legitimate ones, highlighting the challenges in assessing threats accurately.
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