arXiv:2604.17125v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) widens the prompt injection attack surface of large language model applications to tool descriptions, parameter schemas, and tool outputs. Defenses for it are appearing quickly, but their reported figures are not comparable: each is evaluated on a corpus of its authors' construction, under a decision convention that is rarely stated. This paper asks how much those choices decide, taking CASCADE, a fully local layered defense, as the case: three configurations on a frozen 5,000-sample corpus under a pinned revision and a fixed protocol, with that corpus audited in full. Four results follow. First, the aggregation convention dominates the headline metric: counting review referrals as positives reports an 11.70% false-positive rate where 1.51% of benign traffic would be denied without a human, and conceals that 68.5% of all traffic reaches a reviewer. Second, detection is not provenance-invariant: recall ranges from 86.20% on original material to 99.88% on template-generated material, and added false positives fall on original benign records at ten times the rate they fall on transformed ones. Third, the operating point that ran is not readable from the released configuration, which names four candidate thresholds, its deployment files selecting one that did not govern; it is recoverable from point masses the policy layer leaves in the score distribution, so record-level output is a stronger reproducibility guarantee than a parameter table. Fourth, a local review model invoked for 32.56% of requests at 2.51 s each changes no classification outcome: it returned 90 not-malicious verdicts and the policy stage admitted none, making that null a guard setting rather than a model property. The ablation is unsurprising — the rule-based layer reaches 61.05% recall, the semantic stage 94.77% — and that is what makes the other results the substance of the paper.
Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) widens the prompt injection attack surface of large language model applications to tool descriptions, parameter schemas, and tool outputs. Defenses for it are appearing quickly, but their reported figures are not comparable: each is evaluated on a corpus of its authors' construction, under a decision convention that is rarely stated. This paper asks how much those choices decide, taking CASCADE, a fully local layered defense, as the case: three configurations on a frozen 5,000-sample corpus under a pinned revision and a fixed protocol, with that corpus audited in full. Four results follow. First, the aggregation convention dominates the headline metric: counting review referrals as positives reports an 11.70% false-positive rate where 1.51% of benign traffic would be denied without a human, and conceals that 68.5% of all traffic reaches a reviewer. Second, detection is not provenance-invariant: recall ranges from 86.20% on original material to 99.88% on template-generated material, and added false positives fall on original benign records at ten times the rate they fall on transformed ones. Third, the operating point that ran is not readable from the released configuration, which names four candidate thresholds, its deployment files selecting one that did not govern; it is recoverable from point masses the policy layer leaves in the score distribution, so record-level output is a stronger reproducibility guarantee than a parameter table. Fourth, a local review model invoked for 32.56% of requests at 2.51 s each changes no classification outcome: it returned 90 not-malicious verdicts and the policy stage admitted none, making that null a guard setting rather than a model property. The ablation is unsurprising — the rule-based layer reaches 61.05% recall, the semantic stage 94.77% — and that is what makes the other results the substance of the paper.
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